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Which Party Pays the Costs of
Document Disclosure?
Patrick M. Connors*
Surprisingly, the question posed in the title to this piece is
not well settled under New York law.  CPLR Article 31, which
governs disclosure in New York State courts, is somewhat reti-
cent on the subject.1  It is a credit to the bench, the bar, and
Article 31’s flexibility that this issue has not generated more
case law and controversy.  During the first four decades of the
CPLR’s reign, most parties to litigation were apparently able to
amicably resolve disputes concerning who was to shoulder the
costs of document disclosure.2  Typically, each party paid their
respective costs associated with production and rarely sought
judicial intervention to resolve the occasional dispute.3
In the twenty-first century, however, disclosure of electron-
ically stored information has become an integral part of litiga-
tion, and the concomitant costs of document production have
skyrocketed.4  Litigants in cases involving substantial “e-disclo-
sure” now commonly prevail on the New York State courts to
resolve the issue of who should pay the costs of this expensive
undertaking, and recently there have even been disputes in
* Patrick M. Connors is a Professor of Law at Albany Law School where he
teaches New York Practice and Professional Responsibility.  He is the author of
the McKinney’s Practice Commentaries for CPLR Article 31, Disclosure and a
Member of the Office of Court Administration’s Advisory Committee on Civil Prac-
tice.  The inspiration for this piece originated from a vibrant debate on the issue
conducted by two members of the Advisory Committee: Jim Blair and Brian Shoot.
The piece benefitted from their thoughts on the matter.
1. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 31.
2. See generally DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 353 (4th ed. 2005).
3. Id.
4. See generally AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY &
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT
PROJECT 2 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053  (noting the difficul-
ties and costs associated with electronic disclosure, and stating that “discovery can
cost far too much and can become an end in itself”).
441
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cases involving disclosure of paper documents.5  This article ex-
plores the development of a questionable rule cited by several
New York State tribunals in allocating the costs of document
disclosure, while suggesting that the courts adhere to CPLR Ar-
ticle 31’s more flexible approach.
It is helpful to begin the discussion in an area of clarity.
When disclosure is sought from a nonparty witness under
CPLR 3120(1), CPLR 3122(d) acknowledges that there may be
significant expense involved.6  Implicitly recognizing that a non-
party should not be burdened with the costs of another’s litiga-
tion, this subsection unequivocally requires that the reasonable
production expenses of a nonparty witness be defrayed by the
party seeking the disclosure.7
Unfortunately, in situations where one party seeks produc-
tion of “documents or any things” from another,8 Article 31 is
far less clear on the issue of who should bear the initial costs of
production.  No provision in this expansive article expressly
states which party is responsible for the costs of production in-
curred in response to a demand under CPLR 3120. However,
5. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. See also In re Link, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 20, 2009, at 28, col. 1 (Sur. Ct.) (denying trustee’s motion to compel production
of documents in paper form and allowing objectants to produce documents in na-
tive electronic format).
6. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(d) (McKinney 2004).
7. Id.  Prior to the addition of CPLR 3122(d) in 2003,
when a court order was required to obtain documents from a nonparty pur-
suant to CPLR 3120, the court provided for the payment of production ex-
penses right in the order.  This ensured that the nonparty was on notice that
the party seeking the documents ultimately had to pay for their production
or copying.  CPLR 3122(d) does not require the party to inform the nonparty
of its obligation to defray the costs of production, which could lead to some
mischief.  To avoid any accusations in this regard, the party should be cer-
tain to notify the nonparty in writing that it has the obligation to pay for the
reasonable production costs.  The subpoena would be the ideal place to com-
municate this information.  A failure in this regard might tend to make a
court hesitant to enforce the subpoena.
PATRICK M. CONNORS, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, MCKINNEY’S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y.,
Book 7B, CPLR C3122:4 (2004).
8. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120(1)(i) (McKinney 2004).  The courts have interpreted the
language in this provision, requiring the production of “any designated documents
or any things,” to include any relevant electronically stored information. See Lipco
Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *7 (Sup.
Ct. Aug. 18, 2004). See also Etzion v. Etzion, 796 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(“Courts have held that the contents of a computer are analogous to the contents of
a filing cabinet.” (citing Byrne v. Byrne, 650 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1996))).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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subsection (a) of CPLR 3103, Article 31’s protective order provi-
sion, provides that a “court may at any time on its own initia-
tive, or on motion of any party or of any person from whom
discovery is sought, make a protective order denying, limiting,
conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device.”9  An
order issued under CPLR 3103(a) must be “designed to prevent
unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvan-
tage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts.”10  This pro-
vision begs the question of which party, in the first instance, is
obligated to pay the costs associated with a disclosure request.
Professor Siegel has observed that a CPLR 3103(a) protec-
tive order can be issued to “balance the situation in which a dis-
parity in the economic resources of the parties is disabling one
from participating in the disclosure process or empowering an-
other to take undue advantage of it.”11  While the court has the
power under this statute to order one party to shoulder any ex-
penses associated with an adversary’s disclosure,12 Professor
Siegel notes that “this is not a favored step . . . .”13  The “judicial
preference” is to require the parties to individually pay their
own costs associated with the disclosure process and to ulti-
mately allow the party prevailing on the merits to tax such ex-
penses as disbursements and recover them from the losing
side.14
In Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp.,15 the first de-
tailed opinion in the New York State court system addressing
electronic disclosure, the court observed that “[e]lectronic dis-
covery raises a series of issues that were never envisioned by
9. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a) (McKinney 2004).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. SIEGEL, supra note 2, § 353, at 578.
12. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a).
13. SIEGEL, supra note 2, § 353, at 578.
14. Id.  See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8301(a) (McKinney 1981) (“A party to whom
costs are awarded in an action or on appeal is entitled to tax his necessary dis-
bursements for . . . such other reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable
according to the course and practice of the court, by express provision of law or by
order of the court.”).  CPLR Article 31 provides an express rule for the costs in-
curred in connection with a deposition, noting that “[u]nless the court orders other-
wise, the party taking the deposition shall bear the expense thereof.”  N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3116(d).  However, there is no parallel rule addressing the expenses in-
curred in connection with disclosure of “documents and things” under CPLR 3120.
15. No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).
3
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the drafters of the CPLR.”16  Noting that “[t]he cost of providing
computer records can be rather substantial,” in part because
they are normally maintained for far longer periods than paper
records,17 the court concluded that, under the CPLR, “the party
seeking discovery should incur the costs incurred in the produc-
tion of discovery material.”18  Unfortunately, the two decisions
relied upon by the Lipco court to support this proposition are far
from definitive on such a monumental point.
The Lipco court cited Schroeder v. Centro Pariso Tropical,19
a short memorandum opinion from the Second Department,
which briefly noted in a one-sentence paragraph that a defen-
dant in the litigation was not required “to help [a third party
defendant] defray the costs of its own discovery.”20  In the sec-
ond case relied upon in Lipco, Rubin v. Alamo Rent-a-Car,21 one
of only two cases cited in that portion of Schroeder addressing
disclosure expenses,22 the trial court directed the plaintiffs to
bear the costs of redaction and reproduction of documents
sought by a defendant.23  Implementing the procedure most
commonly followed under the CPLR up until that time, the trial
court in Rubin noted that it would tax any costs in connection
with the reproduction should the plaintiff ultimately prevail.24
The Appellate Division in Rubin, however, reversed this aspect
of the trial court’s order, holding that “ ‘each party should shoul-
der the initial burden of financing his own suit, and based upon
such a principle, it is the party seeking discovery of documents
who should pay the cost of their reproduction.’”25
16. Id. at *6.
17. Id. at *8.
18. Id. at *9.
19. 649 N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1996).
20. Id. at 821.
21. 593 N.Y.S.2d 284 (App. Div. 1993).
22. See 649 N.Y.S.2d at 821 (citing Rubin, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 284-86; Rosado v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 480 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125-27 (Sup. Ct. 1984)).
23. 593 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 286 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rosado, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 126).
While Rubin can be read to support the proposition that the party seeking disclo-
sure has an obligation to pay for both the cost of reproduction of documents and
redaction of privileged information from those documents, the decision has been
appropriately interpreted to be limited to the former obligation. See Fletcher v.
Atex, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 45, 50 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“As for expenses of redaction, it is
not at all clear that Rubin stands for the proposition that the cost of redaction—
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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In so holding, the Rubin court relied upon and quoted
Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,26 a 1984 Second De-
partment case in which the plaintiff sought an English transla-
tion of a German brochure produced by the defendant during
disclosure but published by a nonparty to the action.27  In
Rosado, the Second Department concluded that CPLR 2101(b),
which requires that papers “served and filed be in the English
language,”28 does not require a party to translate foreign lan-
guage documents it produces in disclosure.29  The court also
held that CPLR 3120, which generally provides for disclosure of
relevant “documents and things,”30 cannot be construed to com-
pel a party “to create new documents or other tangible items in
order to comply with particular discovery applications.”31
In determining which party should bear the costs of trans-
lation, the Rosado court relied upon “the general assumption
enunciated by our brethren in the First Circuit, namely, that
each party should shoulder the initial burden of financing his
own suit, and based upon such a principle, it is the party seek-
ing discovery of documents who should pay the cost of their
translation.”32  The Rosado court also based its holding on
rather than of copying—may be imposed on the discovering party.”); Waltzer v.
Tradescape & Co., 819 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App. Div. 2006) (“The cost of an examina-
tion by defendants’ agents to see if [documents sought by plaintiff in disclosure]
should not be produced due to privilege or on relevancy grounds should be borne by
defendants.”).
26. 480 N.Y.S.2d 124.
27. Id. at 125. Rosado is the second and only other decision, aside from
Rubin, cited in that portion of Schroeder addressing expenses of disclosure. See
Schroeder, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 821 (citing Rubin, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 284-86; Rosado, 480
N.Y.S.2d at 125-27).
28. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2101(b) (McKinney 1997).
29. 480 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26.
30. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120(1)(i) (McKinney 2004).
31. Rosado, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 126.  The Rosado court explained that “only pres-
ently existing items within a party’s possession, custody or control are susceptible
to an application for production.” Id.
32. Id. at 126 (citing In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 507-09 (1st
Cir. 1982)).  On closer inspection, it does not appear that In re Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority actually supports the proposition that Rosado cites to it for au-
thority.  In In re Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, the First Circuit actually
stated that
[t]o be sure, the respondent is expected to accept the initial expense of pro-
ducing its own documents, answering interrogatories, and submitting to
depositions.  But if the discovery requests threaten to impose “undue burden
or expense” upon a respondent, the district courts are specifically empow-
5
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CPLR 3114,33 which requires the party seeking a deposition of
one who does not understand the English language to bear the
cost of the translation of all questions and answers and to pay
the cost of any experts necessary to assist the court in the set-
tlement of questions in a foreign language.34
In addition to citing Rosado, the Rubin court also included
Wiseman v. American Motors Sales Corp.35 as a “see also” au-
thority to support the proposition that a party seeking disclo-
sure of documents should pay the costs of reproduction.36  Upon
close examination, however, Wiseman does not support such a
blanket rule.  In Wiseman, the defendant moved under CPLR
3108 for a commission to take the deposition in Missouri of a
deputy sheriff who had authored an accident report relevant to
the plaintiff’s claim.37  Recognizing that “oral interrogation is a
more effective method for eliciting information at an examina-
tion before trial,”38 the Second Department concluded that the
defendant could proceed by “open commission” to seek an oral
examination of the witness in Missouri.39  On the issue of ex-
pense, the Wiseman court observed that the record was “devoid
of any proof that plaintiff would not have an equal opportunity
to examine and cross-examine the witness in Missouri” if his
disclosure expenses were not defrayed by the defendant.40
Therefore, the court concluded that the expenses incurred in
connection with the oral deposition in Missouri were to be borne
ered to enter protective orders conditioning the request or requiring the re-
questing party to pay the expenses of production.
687 F.2d at 507.
33. 480 N.Y.S.2d at 126 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3114 (McKinney 2004)).
34. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3114.
35. 479 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1984).
36. See Rubin v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 593 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286 (App. Div. 1993)
(citing Wiseman, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 536).
37. 479 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
38. Id. at 536.
39. Id.  CPLR 3108 authorizes a commission to examine a witness out of the
State through oral questions (open commission) or written questions (sealed com-
mission). See CONNORS, supra note 7, § C3108:5 (“[W]hile for reasons of economy
the written questions are preferred for out-of-state questioning, the questioning
can be oral if the court so directs.”).
40. 479 N.Y.S.2d at 536.  In reaching this conclusion, the court was implicitly
referring to its authority under CPLR 3103(a) to shift costs in disclosure and actu-
ally cited to the Practice Commentaries to this provision. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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“by the respective parties and said expenses may be taxed as
disbursements by the prevailing litigant.”41
Based on the above history, it is apparent that the rule
enunciated in Lipco—that “the party seeking discovery should
incur the costs incurred in the production of discovery mate-
rial”42—traces back to the 1984 opinions in Rosado and Wise-
man. Neither of these decisions, however, actually support
such a blanket proposition.  The Rosado court reached the emi-
nently sensible conclusion that a party seeking disclosure of for-
eign language documents must shoulder the cost of their
translation,43 but it did not specifically address who should pay
the costs of production.44  In Wiseman, the Second Department
required both parties to pay their own travel costs in connection
with the deposition of a nonparty outside the state,45 while not-
ing that these expenses could be recouped by the prevailing
party as a disbursement.46  That result, while certainly reasona-
ble under the facts of Wiseman, provides scant authority for the
proposition delineated in Lipco.
Although the New York courts never clearly established the
uniform rule stated in Lipco, and the text of the CPLR does not
support it,47 several recent decisions have stated the proposition
in the context of requests for disclosure of paper documents and
electronically stored information.  For example, in Waltzer v.
Tradescape & Co.,48 the First Department observed that “as a
general rule, under the CPLR, the party seeking discovery
should bear the cost incurred in the production of discovery ma-
41. Id. See also Bottalico v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 305 N.Y.S.2d 1021,
1021 (App. Div. 1969) (“If plaintiffs elect to examine by open commission, the par-
ties shall pay their respective expenses, which shall be taxed as costs by the pre-
vailing party.”); CONNORS, supra note 7, § C3108:5 (noting that when the court
orders an open commission, “[t]he expenses are usually borne by the respective
parties . . . , but the court under CPLR 3103(a) can direct the party who wishes the
oral examination outside the state to pay the expenses of the other side in order
that the latter have an equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine the
witness.”).
42. No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).
43. Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 480 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (App. Div.
1984).
44. See id. at 125-27.
45. 479 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
48. 819 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 2006).
7
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terial . . . .”49  In affirming the order striking the defendants’
answer pursuant to CPLR 3126(3), based, in part, on their fail-
ure to produce electronically stored documents,50 the court
noted that the defendants could not excuse their “willful and
contumacious” failure merely because the plaintiff did not agree
to pay the costs of providing the documents.51  Rather, “when
the parties disagreed as to the form of discovery of the two CDs
containing the 160,000 pages, defendants could and should
have asked the court to resolve the issue.”52  While the Waltzer
court states the same blanket rule enunciated in Lipco, it de-
clines to actually apply it and opts for a more flexible approach
that essentially requires the parties to seek judicial interven-
tion in the event of a disagreement on the issue of which party
should pay the upfront costs of disclosure.53
In Vinings Spinal Diagnostic v. Progressive Casualty Insur-
ance Co.,54 the plaintiff sought a copy of an assignor’s no-fault
file that was in the defendant’s possession.55  The defendant did
not dispute that the documents were relevant but refused to
provide them unless the plaintiff paid the cost of reproducing
49. Id. at 40.  The court indicated that this “general rule” might not be appli-
cable in Waltzer because the disclosure request did not require “the retrieval of
deleted electronically stored material, the data sought was on two CDs and readily
available.  The cost of copying and giving them to plaintiff would have been incon-
sequential.” Id. See also In re Maura, 842 N.Y.S.2d 851, 859 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (“The
CPLR provides that the party seeking discovery should incur the costs incurred in
the production of discovery material.” (citing Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting
Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004))); Etzion v.
Etzion, 796 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (“Under the CPLR, the party seeking
discovery should incur the costs in the production of discovery material.”).
50. 819 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 40.
53. See id. at 39-40. Any motion relating to disclosure must be accompanied
by “an affirmation that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing party
in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion.” N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.7(a) (2009).  “The affirmation of the good faith effort to
resolve the issues raised by the motion shall indicate the time, place and nature of
the consultation and the issues discussed and any resolutions, or shall indicate
good cause why no such conferral with counsel for opposing parties was held.” Id.
§ 202.7(c).
54. 829 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Dist. Ct. 2006), appeal dismissed, No. 2007-582NC,
2008 WL 2814831 (App. Term July 10, 2008).
55. Id. at 871.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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them.56  The plaintiff contended that if the court ordered it to
pay the reproduction costs, the ruling would “ ‘set a precedent
on both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s bar to charge each other
for the cost of reproduction of documents.’”57  The District Court
cited CPLR 3103(a) and acknowledged it had broad discretion
“to set the terms and conditions of discovery,”58 but ultimately
invoked “the rule in the Second Department,” as stated in
Rubin, Schroeder, and Lipco, and required the plaintiff to pay
the reproduction costs.59  Declaring that it could exercise its
“protective powers under CPLR 3103(a) in cases where there is
a disparity in the parties’ economic resources, or where the ex-
pense of the disclosure greatly exceeds the small monetary re-
covery sought by the party,”60 the court concluded that there
was no basis in the case for departing from “the precedent and
general rule in th[e] [Second] Department.”61  The court also
confirmed, as noted above, that “the legislature contemplated
that the party who ultimately prevails on the merits is permit-
ted at that later time to tax as disbursements the expenses in-
curred in connection with disclosure and recover them from the
losing side.”62
56. Id.  The court acknowledged the surprising lack of clarity in this area,
stating that
the parties could not resolve their dispute over a narrow question which is
discussed daily between practitioners in this field but apparently has not
been officially reported upon in New York: does the plaintiff have to pay the
defendant for the cost incurred by the defendant in copying its no-fault file?
Id. at 871-72.
57. Id. at 872.
58. Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a) (McKinney 2004)).  CPLR 3103 applies in
the District Court.  N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1101(c) (McKinney 1989).
59. Vinings, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (citing Schroeder v. Centro Pariso Tropical,
649 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (App. Div. 1996); Rubin v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 593 N.Y.S.2d
284, 285-86 (App. Div. 1993); Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/
01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004)).
60. Id. at 873.
61. Id.  But see Town of Eastchester v. Shawn’s Lawns, Inc., 858 N.Y.S.2d 358,
359 (App. Div. 2008) (“The [Supreme Court] also providently exercised its discre-
tion in directing [the plaintiffs] to pay the cost of [defendant’s disclosure request].
While the general rule is that a party should shoulder the initial burden of financ-
ing his or her own lawsuit, here, based upon the circumstances surrounding dis-
covery, the [plaintiff] should have sought a protective order pursuant to CPLR
3103(a).” (citation omitted)).
62. 829 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8301(a) (McKinney 1981)).
9
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The pronouncement in Lipco that “the party seeking discov-
ery should incur the costs incurred in the production of discov-
ery material,”63 which has now been subscribed to by several
courts,64 should be reexamined for several reasons.  As noted
above, the text of the CPLR does not support it,65 and the case
law cited in Lipco does not establish such a blanket proposi-
tion.66  Furthermore, the rule detracts from the unique flexibil-
ity of Article 31, which is eminently desirable in this context.67
At first blush, a rule requiring the party seeking disclosure
to pay the costs associated with it appears to best promote effi-
ciency.  If a party knows it will be required to defray any costs
attributable to its own disclosure request, it will have a strong
incentive to limit the scope of its demands and thereby avoid
unnecessary expense.  While this is generally true, it places
only a minimal stimulus on the party producing the material to
maintain the documents in a manner that simplifies their re-
trieval and production.  Furthermore, the producing party has
little incentive to minimize the cost of retrieval and reproduc-
tion.  This can be particularly important in a case requiring dis-
closure of significant amounts of electronically stored
information where a third party is often required to assist with
the production.
The system is better served if each party operates under
the assumption that it will be required to pay any costs associ-
ated with the production of documents.  While a party seeking
disclosure could always make a motion under CPLR 3103(a) to
request that the court depart from any governing rule,68 these
motions will become far more common if New York State courts
are governed by the rule espoused in Lipco.  Under Lipco’s rule,
only minimal inducement exists for the producing party to
63. Lipco, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9.
64. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text. See also T.A. Ahern Con-
tractors Corp. v. Dormitory Auth., 875 N.Y.S.2d 862, 869 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009)
(applying the Lipco rule and refusing to order the production of relevant e-mails
and/or electronic documents in the Outlook mailboxes of twenty-seven of the defen-
dant’s employees “until such time as [the plaintiff] communicates that it is willing
to bear the costs incurred for their production subject to any possible reallocation
of costs at trial” (citation omitted)).
65. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 19-46 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
68. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a) (McKinney 2004).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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share in the costs of production prior to a court application.  The
producing party can simply rely on the rule, refuse to pay any of
the costs associated with production, and require the party
seeking the disclosure to make an application to the court to
deviate from the rule.  If the court grants the motion, the pro-
ducing party will likely be in no worse position than it would
have occupied if it originally agreed to pay a portion of the pro-
duction costs.  In sum, if the blanket rule stated in Lipco is not
hovering over all disclosure disputes, the parties will have
greater incentive to resolve disputes without court intervention.
The Lipco rule will also generate debate on several collat-
eral issues.  In a case in which there is a request for a limited
number of hard-copy or electronic documents that are readily
identifiable and available, the application of the rule is rela-
tively straightforward.69  If, more typically, the documents
sought in disclosure are voluminous and contain information
protected by a privilege70 or by the work-product doctrine,71
there will be costs associated with interposing appropriate ob-
jections, redacting the information, and assembling a privilege
log.72  There may also be significant costs associated with or-
69. Under the rule stated in Lipco, the party seeking the documents merely
pays the costs of reproduction. See Lipco Electrical Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp.,
No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).  The Lipco court
noted, however, that
[c]ustomarily, [with traditional paper discovery] if the volume of documents
demanded is small, the party upon whom the demand is made copies the
documents and serves them upon the party demanding discovery.  If the de-
manded documents are voluminous, the party responding to the demand ad-
vises the party demanding the documents that the documents are available
for review, identification and copying at the demander’s expense.
Id.
70. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(b) (McKinney 2004) (“Upon objection by a person
entitled to assert the privilege, privileged matter shall not be obtainable.”).
71. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(2) (granting a qualified immunity for material
“prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial”).
72. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a) (McKinney 2004) (requiring a party or person
objecting to a demand under CPLR 3120 or 3121 to, among other things, “state
with reasonable particularity the reasons for each objection”); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3122(b) (“Whenever a . . . person withholds one or more documents that appear to
be within the category of the documents required by [a notice, subpoena, or order]
to be produced, such person shall give notice to the party seeking the production
and inspection of the documents that one or more such documents are being with-
held” and provide, among other things, “the legal ground for withholding each such
document . . . .”).
11
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ganizing and labeling documents “to correspond to the catego-
ries in the request,” if a party desires to produce them in this
fashion.73  Finally, there may be substantial costs and fees in-
curred in defending a motion to compel production of docu-
ments.74  Can the party responding to a disclosure request in
this scenario attempt to pass off all of these costs to the party
seeking the information on the ground that they were “incurred
in the production of discovery material”?75
It is respectfully submitted that the disclosure process will
function more efficiently and fairly without a general rule re-
quiring the party seeking “documents or any things”76 to bear
the costs of production.  The parties should be encouraged to
discuss issues concerning the costs of disclosure at the earliest
possible opportunity and certainly at the preliminary confer-
ence.77  If agreement cannot be reached, either party can move
73. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(c) (“Whenever a person is required . . . to produce docu-
ments for inspection, that person shall produce them as they are kept in the regu-
lar course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond to the
categories in the request.”).  These problems expand in the age of electronic disclo-
sure.  The documents may still be on a hard drive or may be on some form of back-
up that may be difficult to retrieve.  Some documents may have been deleted.  Fur-
thermore, the software that was used to create and store the documents may no
longer be commercially available.
74. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a) (“The party seeking disclosure under rule 3120 or
section 3121 may move for an order under rule 3124 or section 2308 with respect to
any objection to, or other failure to respond to or permit inspection as requested by,
the notice or subpoena duces tecum, respectively, or any part thereof.”).
75. Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL
1949062, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).
76. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120(1)(i) (McKinney 2004).
77. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12 (2009).  The 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the parties to meet
and confer prior to a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference to discuss “any issues about dis-
closure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or
forms in which it should be produced.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).  This new provi-
sion was designed to require the parties to attempt to reach agreement on issues
regarding electronic disclosure at the earliest possible stages of the litigation. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Notes of Advisory Committee on 2006 Amendments.  The New
York City Bar Association has proposed that Uniform Rule 202.12, entitled “Pre-
liminary Conference,” be amended to include a specific provision requiring the “es-
tablishment of the method and scope of any electronic discovery” to be considered
at the preliminary conference. See Letter from Andrea Masley, Chair, Comm. on
State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction, to Members of the N.Y. State Admin. Bd.,
N.Y. State Office of Court Admin. (Dec. 28, 2007), available at http://www.nycbar.
org/pdf/report/bar%20comm%20ediscovery%20ltr.pdf.  Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules
of the Commercial Division contains similar requirements and, according to the
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/3
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for a protective order under CPLR 3103(a) to request that the
court balance any perceived disparity.78  In the absence of a gen-
eral rule similar to the one stated in Lipco, there will be more
incentive on the parties to reach an agreement without court
intervention.  Finally, the prevailing party can always attempt
to recover any expenses incurred in disclosure by seeking to tax
them as costs at the conclusion of the matter.79
New York City Bar, “this rule has worked well in the Commercial Division and
should be adopted state-wide.” Id.
On March 20, 2009, the Chief Administrative Judge amended Uniform Rule
202.12 to, among other things, require courts to consider issues pertaining to elec-
tronic disclosure at the Preliminary Conference. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 202.12(c)(3).  Under the revised rule, “[w]here the court deems [it] appropri-
ate,” it may prescribe
the method and scope of any electronic discovery, including but not limited
to (a) retention of electronic data and implementation of a data preservation
plan, (b) scope of electronic data review, (c) identification of relevant data,
(d) identification and redaction of privileged electronic data, (e) the scope,
extent and form of production, (f) anticipated cost of data recovery and pro-
posed initial allocation of such cost, (g) disclosure of the programs and man-
ner in which the data is maintained, (h) identification of computer system(s)
utilized, and (i) identification of the individual(s) responsible for data
preservation.
Id.
78. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a) (McKinney 2004).  Any motion under CPLR 3103
must be accompanied by “an affirmation that counsel has conferred with counsel
for the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the
motion.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.7(a).  “The affirmation of the
good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion shall indicate the time,
place and nature of the consultation and the issues discussed and any resolutions,
or shall indicate good cause why no such conferral with counsel for opposing par-
ties was held.” Id. § 202.7(c). See also CONNORS, supra note 7, § C3103:3A.
79. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8301(a) (McKinney 1981).
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